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 2 
Efforts to limit climate change below a given temperature level require that global emissions 1 
of CO2 cumulated over time remain below a limited quota. This quota varies depending on 2 
the temperature level, the desired probability of keeping below this level, and the 3 
contributions of other gases. In spite of the limited quota, global emissions of CO2 from fossil 4 
fuel combustion and cement production have continued to grow by 2.5% per year on average 5 
over the past decade. Two thirds of the CO2 emission quota consistent with a 2°C 6 
temperature limit has been used, and the total quota will likely be exhausted in a further 30 7 
years at the 2014 emissions rates. We show that CO2 emissions track the high end of the latest 8 
generation of emissions scenarios, due to lower than anticipated carbon intensity 9 
improvements of emerging economies and higher global GDP growth. In the absence of more 10 
stringent mitigation, these trends are set to continue and further decline the remaining quota 11 
until the onset of a potential new climate agreement in 2020. Breaking current emission 12 
trends in the short term is key to retain credible climate targets within a rapidly diminishing 13 
emission quota.  14 
 15 
Recent studies have identified a near-linear relationship between global mean temperature change 16 
and total CO2 emissions cumulated over time
1-9
. This relationship leads to an intuitive and 17 
appealing application in climate policy. A global “quota” on cumulative CO2 emissions from all 18 
sources (fossil fuel combustion, industrial processes and land-use change) can be directly linked to 19 
a nominated temperature threshold with a specified probability of success. It can be used regardless 20 
of where or, to a large degree, when the emissions occur
10
.  21 
 22 
Despite the many reservoirs and timescales that affect the response of the climate and carbon 23 
cycle
11
, the proportionality between temperature and cumulative CO2 emissions is remarkably 24 
robust across models. The relationship has been called the Transient Climate Response to 25 
 3 
cumulative carbon Emissions (TCRE) and was highlighted in the fifth assessment report (AR5) of 1 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
12
. The near-linear relationship has strong 2 
theoretical support: radiative forcing per emitted tonne of CO2 decreases with higher CO2 3 
concentrations, an effect which is compensated by the weakening of the ocean and biosphere 4 
carbon sinks leading to a larger fraction of emitted CO2 remaining in the atmosphere
13-15
. The 5 
uncertainty in the TCRE, accounted for here in the given probability
12,16
, thus comes from the 6 
climate response to CO2 and the carbon cycle feedbacks
14,17-19
. The near-linear relationship holds 7 
for cumulative CO2 emissions less than about 7500 GtCO2 and until temperatures peak
16
.  8 
 9 
Although CO2 is the dominant anthropogenic forcing of the climate system
20
, non-CO2 greenhouse 10 
gases and aerosols also contribute to climate change. However, unlike for CO2, the forcing from 11 
short-lived agents is not related to the cumulative emissions but directly determined by annual 12 
emissions
21-23
. Therefore it is necessary to account for the additional warming from non-CO2 agents 13 
separately when estimating CO2 emission quotas compatible with a given temperature limit. The 14 
forcing from non-CO2 agents has a considerable range across emissions scenarios in the recent 15 
IPCC Working Group III (WGIII) database
24
, reflecting expected development pathways, 16 
coherently for CO2 and other forcing agents given the underlying climate and other policies
25
. 17 
Generally, forcing from non-CO2 agents contributes 10-30% of the total forcing
9
 (Figure S1).  18 
 19 
For a 66% probability of keeping below a temperature threshold of 2°C, CO2 emissions would need 20 
to be kept below 3670 GtCO2 if accounting for forcing from CO2 only (4440 GtCO2 for a 50% 21 
probability)
12,26
. When accounting for both CO2 and non-CO2 forcing as represented in the multiple 22 
scenarios available in the IPCC WGIII database, the quota associated with a 66% probability of 23 
keeping warming below 2°C reduces to 3200 [2900-3600] GtCO2 (3500 [3100-3900] GtCO2 for a 24 
 4 
50% probability) (Table 1, Table S1, Supplementary Information). Every additional 900 GtCO2 1 
emitted will increase warming by about 0.5°C globally (50% probability).  2 
 3 
In recent years, interest has grown in using cumulative emissions more directly in climate 4 
policy
9,27-30
. In the following we update regional and global emission estimates up to 2014 and 5 
provide projections up to 2019. The emission estimates and trends are used to update the emission 6 
quota remaining from 2020, the potential year for the onset of a new global climate agreement. We 7 
explore various uncertainties with cumulative emissions and the consequences for the remaining 8 
quota. We compare the emission trends and remaining emission quota with the emissions scenarios 9 
used in the recently published IPCC AR5 WGIII report that are consistent with keeping the global 10 
temperature increase below 2ºC above preindustrial levels. This analysis thus brings together 11 
currently disjoint perspectives: 1) the dependence between cumulative emission and global 12 
temperature changes, 2) the decomposition of recent trends in emission, and 3) mitigation pathways 13 
from Integrated Assessment Modelling, and analyses their consistency with the 2ºC climate target. 14 
 15 
CO2 emission update 16 
 17 
The CO2 emission quota compatible with a given temperature limit encompasses both past and 18 
future emissions. Since CO2 is emitted each year, the remaining quota decreases with time. Here, 19 
we first update the remaining emissions quota, by providing updated estimates of cumulative 20 
emissions through to 2013 before projecting emissions up to 2019. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 21 
combustion and cement production (EFF) were estimated at 36.1 (34.3–37.9) GtCO2 in 2013, 2.3% 22 
above emissions in 2012 (Figure 1a, Methods). Cumulative emissions from fossil fuel combustion 23 
and cement production from 1870 to 2013 were 1430±70GtCO2. Historical emission estimates are 24 
based on energy consumption statistics
31
, and include uncertainties in the energy statistics and 25 
 5 
conversion rates
31,32
. Recent attempts have been made to verify emissions from atmospheric 1 
measurements and modelling
33
, but their interpretation is hindered by the influence of the carbon 2 
sinks
34,35
. 3 
 4 
On short time scales, the changes in CO2 emissions from fossil fuels combustion and cement 5 
production are generally driven by increases in economic activity as measured by the Gross 6 
Domestic Product (GDP) and the decrease (improvements) in the carbon intensity of the world 7 
economy (IFF)
36,37
. A decomposition of emissions into a simplified Kaya identity, EFF = GDP · IFF, 8 
offers an effective way to understand short-term emissions trends
38-42
. This simple relationship will 9 
be used through this article to understand drivers of recent past emission changes and provide 10 
short-term emission projections. 11 
 12 
In the last decade (2004-2013) global CO2 emissions have continued strong growth of 2.5%/yr. 13 
This growth rate was below the 3.3%/yr growth rate averaged over the 2000-2009 decade because 14 
of the lower 2.4%/yr growth rate since 2010 (Figure 1a). Using the simplified Kaya identity, the 15 
decrease in the growth rate of global CO2 emissions in recent years has been due, in roughly equal 16 
parts, to a slight decrease in GDP growth rate and a slightly stronger decrease in IFF (Figure S2). 17 
The high decadal growth rate in global emissions is due to strong growth in economic activity and 18 
emissions in emerging economies, partly due to the intensification of world trade
43,44
, and slightly 19 
decreasing emissions in some large developed countries
44
. These patterns have led to a significant 20 
regional redistribution in emissions in all key dimensions: absolute, per-capita, and cumulative 21 
(Table 2, Figure 2a).  The top four emitters play a critical role in emissions growth, China 22 
accounted for 57% of the growth in global emissions from 2012-2013, USA for 20%, India for 23 
17%, while EU28 had a negative contribution of -11%.  24 
 6 
 1 
The developed countries (taken as Annex B in the Kyoto Protocol) had a 0.4% increase in 2 
emissions in 2013, reversing the trend of decreased emissions since 2007. The USA‟s 2.9% growth 3 
in emissions in 2013 reversed the nation‟s trend of decreasing emissions since 2007 as a result of a 4 
return to stronger economic growth rate (2.2%), and an unusual increase in IFF (0.7%) (Figure 2c 5 
and Figure S2c), largely because coal has regained some market share from natural gas in the 6 
electric power sector
45. The EU28‟s 1.8% decrease in emissions in 2013 continued the persistent 7 
downward trend despite increased coal consumption in some EU countries (e.g., Poland, Germany, 8 
and Finland). The decrease in emissions in the EU28 was driven by a relatively low GDP growth 9 
rate (0.5%) and decrease in IFF (2.2%) (Figure 2d and Figure S2d), with largest emission decreases 10 
occurring in Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and the largest increase in Germany. 11 
 12 
Developing countries and emerging economies (taken as non-Annex B) had a 3.4% increase in 13 
emissions in 2013, continuing previous trends
42
. China‟s 4.2% growth in emissions in 2013 14 
continued its decelerating growth (Figure 2b) from 10% per year for 2000-2009 to 6.1% per year 15 
for 2010-2013. The reduction of the emissions growth rate in China is due to decreasing GDP 16 
growth combined with stronger decrease in IFF (Figure S2b). It is too early to say whether the 17 
recent decline in IFF in 2013 can be attributed to dedicated mitigation policies. Despite the stronger 18 
decrease in IFF, the high absolute IFF in China, combined with strong GDP growth, is the main 19 
reason for the weakening IFF at the global level (Figure S3). India‟s 5.1% growth in emissions in 20 
2013 compares to growth rates of 5.7% from 2000-2009 and 6.4% from 2010-2013 (Figure 2e). 21 
The recent Indian emissions growth was driven by robust economic growth, and by an increase in 22 
IFF (Figure S2e). India is the only major economy with a sustained increase in IFF  (carbonisation of 23 
its economy) from 2010-2013 (Figure 2 and Figure S2). 24 
 25 
 7 
The robust emerging relationship between GDP and EFF in the past (Figure 1 and Figure 2) is used 1 
here to estimate future emissions on short time scales using projected growth rates of GDP by the 2 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
46
 combined with an assumption of persistent trends in IFF
40,42
. 3 
This method provides first-order estimates of CO2 emissions in the absence of additional emission 4 
mitigation policies. Based on the forecast 3.3% increase of global GDP in 2014 (IMF)
47
, and the 5 
trend in IFF over 2004-2013 of -0.7%/yr, we estimate 2014 EFF to be 37.0 [34.8–39.3] GtCO2, or 6 
2.5 % [1.3%–3.5%] over 2013 and 65% over 1990 emissions (Figure 1). The uncertainty range 7 
takes into account the uncertainty in IMF GDP projections and variability in IFF caused by a range 8 
of socio-economic factors
42
 (Supplementary Information). Similar estimates are made at the 9 
country level (Table 2 and Figure 2). While strong inertial factors maintain global emissions 10 
growth within a relatively small range, at the regional level significant and unexpected events can 11 
lead to strong deviations, and regional uncertainty is much more difficult to quantify. We therefore 12 
do not provide uncertainty estimates at the regional level, but acknowledge that they are potentially 13 
large. 14 
Emissions from land-use changes have been stable or decreasing in the past decade
48
, and currently 15 
contribute about 8% of total CO2 emissions. We estimate land-use change emissions to 2013 using 16 
the most recent Global Carbon Budget
49
 based on a combination of a bookkeeping estimate
48
 and 17 
fire emissions in deforested areas
50
 (Methods). We estimate emissions of 3.2±1.6 GtCO2 yr
-1
 in 18 
2013 and use the 2004-2013 average of 3.3±1.6 GtCO2 yr
-1
 for 2014-2019. Thus, total CO2 19 
emissions from all sources are estimated to be 39.4 [35.9–42.8] GtCO2 in 2013 and 40.3 [36.4–20 
44.2] GtCO2 in 2014.  21 
Based on combined data and our 2014 estimate, cumulative CO2 emissions from all sources during 22 
1870-2014 will reach 2000±180 GtCO2. About 25% of this 145 year period was emitted over the 23 
 8 
last 15 years alone (2000-2014). The cumulative emissions from 1870 were 75% from fossil fuels 1 
and cement production and 25% from land-use change.  2 
 3 
Remaining CO2 quota 4 
 5 
Taking into account CO2 emissions to 2014, the remaining emissions quota (from 2015 onwards) 6 
associated with a 66% probability of keeping warming below 2°C is estimated to be 1200 [900-7 
1600] GtCO2. This 2°C quota will be exhausted in about 30 [22-40] years of emissions (which we 8 
refer to hereafter as equivalent emission-years) at the 2014 emission level (40.3 GtCO2/yr). Due to 9 
inter-annual and decadal variability
51-53
, the actual year when 2°C will be reached is more 10 
uncertain. The remaining quota associated with a 50% probability of committing to 2°C of 11 
warming is estimated to be 1500 [1100-1900] GtCO2 (Table 1), with equivalent emission-years of 12 
37 [27-47] years at the 2014 emission level. The remaining quota is significantly higher for 3°C 13 
(Table 1), but it is limited for all warming levels, even the highest ones. The equivalent emission-14 
years indicator is a simple and transparent metric to communicate the size of the remaining carbon 15 
budget compatible with a warming level given our current emission levels. 16 
 17 
Many of the low stabilisation scenarios in the literature, such as the RCP2.6, rely on emissions 18 
below zero (so called „negative emissions‟) in the second half of the century, in effect 19 
compensating for emissions today
24,54
. Most models achieve negative emissions through intensive 20 
use of bioenergy coupled with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)
55-57
, and the availability of 21 
BECCS is important in cost-effective 2
°
C mitigation pathways
55,56
. Negative emissions at the global 22 
level will reduce the cumulative emissions over time, leading to a peak and decline in cumulative 23 
emissions
58
.  24 
 25 
 9 
The validity of TCRE in negative emissions scenario remains to be fully assessed, analyses with 1 
comprehensive Earth System models are required to fully explore the carbon cycle and climate 2 
response to negative emission scenarios (though research has started in this area
10,59-61
). There is 3 
also a need to fully explore the risks of relying on BECCS (currently unavailable at scale) for 2°C 4 
mitigation pathways. Studies show that explicitly limiting or eliminating the availability of CCS 5 
and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies in mitigation scenarios does not necessarily rule 6 
out the feasibility of 2°C, but does increase the need for deep emission reductions in the short 7 
term
55,56,62
. The few studies that explored 2°C pathways without CCS and CDR from emission 8 
levels that are in line with the current emission reduction pledges of countries by 2020 found these 9 
to be either infeasible
63-68
 or extremely costly
64,67-69
. 10 
 11 
Emission projections and climate targets 12 
 13 
Current emission growth rates are twice as large as in the 1990s despite 20 years of international 14 
climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 15 
(UNFCCC). For illustration, we expand our GDP-based emissions projections to 2019 using GDP 16 
projections from the IMF
46,47
 and continued trends in IFF. Assuming a continuation of past climate 17 
policy trends through to 2019 (the last available year of IMF‟s GDP projections), we project an 18 
average growth of fossil fuel and cement emissions of 3.1 %/yr to reach 43.2 [39.7–45.6] GtCO2/yr 19 
in 2019. The uncertainty range accounts for the uncertainty in GDP and fossil fuel intensity 20 
projections (Supplementary Information), but does not account for unforeseen events (e.g., a global 21 
financial crisis
40
). Policies or trends that further reduce IFF, or would lower GDP growth rates, 22 
would directly reduce these emission estimates. The recent US policy announcements on power 23 
plant emissions or China‟s energy efficiency and renewable targets would at least continue existing 24 
IFF trends, but it unclear at present if they would lead to stronger decreases in IFF. Emission 25 
 10 
projections accounting for current policies such as those from International Energy Agency
70
 and 1 
baseline projections available in the literature and summarised in IPCC WGIII often show a lower 2 
growth rate than our GDP-based projection (Figures 3 and 4), either based on an assumption of 3 
slower GDP growth of a stronger decrease in IFF.  4 
 5 
We additionally extend these projections to the regional level using the same methods. Figure 2 6 
show the regional trends in GDP, IFF and hence EFF. In general, anticipated GDP growth is offset 7 
by decreases in IFF (Figure S2). We find that Chinese emissions would continue to grow at 3.9%/yr 8 
over 2014-2019, USA emissions at 0.2%/yr similar to recent estimates by the US Energy 9 
Information Administration
71
, EU28 emissions reduce by -0.9%/yr, and Indian emissions grow at 10 
5.9%/yr (Table 2, Figure 2 and Figure S2).   11 
 12 
Based on these projections, the cumulative fossil fuel and cement emissions over 2015-2019 are 13 
estimated to be 200 [190-210] GtCO2. Assuming stable land-use change emissions, we expect 14 
additional 16 [8-24] GtCO2 during that period. This brings total cumulative emissions for 2015-15 
2019 to 220 [200-240] GtCO2, and the remaining emission quota from 2020, associated with a 66% 16 
probability of limiting warming below 2°C, down to 1000 [700-1400] GtCO2, or 22 [15–30] 17 
equivalent emission-years from 2020. The remaining quotas from 2020 onwards and equivalent 18 
emission-years for 3°C and 4°C levels are given in Table 1. 19 
 20 
Our GDP-based emission estimates are higher than all cost-effective 2°C scenarios in the literature 21 
(Figure 3) for 2010–2019. In fact, current IPCC WGIII scenarios that attempt to keep warming to 22 
below 2°C, show lower emissions for 2014 than our projection (Figure 3b), mostly because these 23 
scenarios were published before 2014 and assumed a „cost-optimal‟ mitigation pathway starting 24 
2010. In 2019, the discrepancy between our GDP-based estimates and the cost-effective mitigation 25 
 11 
pathways is even more exacerbated, with the GDP-based emissions projections being about 40% 1 
higher than the levels suggested by cost-effective 2°C scenarios (Figure 3c). This indicates that 2 
without a rapid and clear break in historical trends of IFF or GDP the opportunity to follow cost-3 
effective 2°C mitigation pathways in the near-term, as reported in IPCC WGIII, has passed, and the 4 
challenges to mitigation would need to be framed around the more costly scenarios that assume a 5 
delay in comprehensive mitigation
64,67-69
.  6 
 7 
The IPCC WGIII mitigation scenarios consistent with the 2°C limit show a reduction or even 8 
reversal in the CO2 emissions growth due to radical decreases of IFF (Figure 4c). While GDP 9 
growth rates are similar to our estimate (Figure 4b), they show a carbon intensity decreasing by 2 to 10 
5% per year, as opposed to 0.8% per year in our estimate based on recent trends
64,66-68
 (Figure 4c). 11 
The rapidly changing structure of the world economy with a growing contribution from emerging 12 
economies and developing countries with a high carbon-intensity drives increases in IFF at the 13 
global level (Figure S3) and further exacerbates the mitigation challenge. For emerging economies 14 
and developing countries, the carbon intensity decreases in the recent past, which we use for our 15 
near-term projections, has been significantly below the near-term trends anticipated by most 16 
emission scenarios, even baseline scenarios in absence of climate policy (see Figure S4-S8 for a 17 
comparison of regions trends in GDP and IFF with IPCC WGIII emission scenarios). 18 
 19 
Climate Policy Implications 20 
 21 
Climate policy discussions have progressed since 2010 and many countries have pledged to limit or 22 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020
72-74
. While projected GDP-based projections of 23 
emissions are considerably higher than those of the cost-optimal 2
o
C scenarios, recent studies have 24 
shown that even from such high emission levels in 2020, options exist to limit warming to below 25 
 12 
2°C
64,66-69
. However, following such trajectories entails important consequences and risks. Five 1 
main challenges and trade-offs must be overcome
64,66-68,75-77
: (a) higher emissions in the near term 2 
require stronger emission reductions thereafter – a trade-off which has become trivially 3 
understandable since the introduction of the TCRE concept and the quantification of 2°C-consistent 4 
carbon emission quota; (b) an increased lock-in into carbon-intensive and energy-intensive 5 
infrastructure
66,67,78,79
 – the recent trends discussed above provide real-world support for this 6 
concern; (c) reduced societal choices for future generations – modest near-term emission reductions 7 
increase the dependence on specific mitigation technologies and therewith foreclose choices and 8 
options of future generations
55,64,66-69,79
 (dependence on negative emissions technologies is one 9 
example); (d) higher overall costs and economic challenges; and (e) higher climate risks through 10 
e.g. higher near-term rates of change, higher cumulative climate impact damages, or an increased 11 
probability of abrupt or irreversible changes
64,68,77,80
.  12 
 13 
Stabilization of global temperature rise at any level requires global carbon emissions to become 14 
eventually virtually zero
81
. The existence of a limited global emission quota raises many issues of 15 
how to share remaining emissions, including how to take into account historical responsibilities and 16 
development needs. These issues are discussed in a companion paper
82
. Irrespective of the 17 
difficulty of how to share the remaining quota, our review of recent emission trends and the 18 
mitigation scenario literature shows that, if keeping warming to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial 19 
levels is to be maintained as an overarching objective, a break in current emission trends is urgently 20 
needed in the short term.  21 
  22 
 13 
Methods 1 
Data: Global and regional CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement emissions are 2 
based on emissions estimates from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
83
 (CDIAC), 3 
extended to 2013 using anomalies in energy statistics from BP
84
 following the methodology and 4 
country definitions used in the Global Carbon Budget
42
. CO2 emissions from land-use change are 5 
estimated using a bookkeeping method
48
 from 1850-2010 and then supplemented and extended 6 
from 1997- 2013 using satellite-based fire emissions in deforestation areas
50
, following the 7 
methodology in the most recent Global Carbon Budget
49
. GDP data is from the International 8 
Energy Agency
85
 up until 2011 and extended to 2013 using the growth rates from two editions of 9 
the IMF‟s World Economic Outlook46,47. The IPCC WGIII scenarios are obtained from the scenario 10 
database
24,86
.  11 
 12 
Uncertainty: We place an uncertainty of ±5% (1σ) on the fossil-fuel and cement emissions31,42 13 
consistent with recent detailed analysis of uncertainty
32
 and apply the same uncertainty for the 14 
cumulative emissions (Supplementary Information). The uncertainty in emission projections 15 
includes the uncertainty in future GDP estimates and different time periods for estimating IFF, and 16 
consecutive emission estimates are assumed to be uncorrelated (Supplementary Information). The 17 
allowable cumulative emissions quota is derived with a certain modelled likelihood (% of model 18 
runs) that a specified warming level is exceeded (e.g. 2°C above the average over 1850-1900) 19 
including non-CO2 forcing (Supplementary Information). Quotas are shown with a 5%–95% range, 20 
rounded to the nearest 100. The range in equivalent emission-years is obtained taking the range in 21 
remaining budget, neglecting the relatively small uncertainty due to global annual emissions 22 
uncertainty.  23 
 24 
 14 
Growth rates: Growth rates between two years (e.g., 2012-2013) are based on the percentage 1 
increase over the first year. To prevent invalid interpretations of annual change we make leap year 2 
adjustments to annual growth rates, such that growth rates go up approximately 0.3% if the first 3 
year is a leap year and down 0.3% if the second year is a leap year. Growth rates over more than 4 
two consecutive years are computed by taking the first derivative of the linear regression of the 5 
logarithm of all variables available in this time period (Supplementary Information).   6 
 15 
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Figure Legends 1 
Figure 1. Global CO2 emissions and decomposition into GDP and carbon intensity. Global 2 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production (a) and global GDP and carbon 3 
intensity of GDP (IFF) (b) over the historical 1990–2013 period (black, blue, and green dots) and 4 
estimates to 2019 (red dots). Historical emissions are from CDIAC and BP, while GDP are from 5 
IEA and IMF (Methods). Uncertainty in CO2 emissions is ±5% (1σ) over the historical period with 6 
an additional uncertainty for the projection based on a sensitivity analysis of GDP and IFF.  7 
 8 
Figure 2. Regional CO2 emissions and decomposition into GDP and carbon intensity. The CO2 9 
emissions in the top 4 emitters (China, US, EU28, India) (a) and the GDP and IFF in each region (b-10 
e) over the historical (1990-2013) and future (2014-2019) period. See Figure 1 caption for details 11 
and Figure S2 for an annual decomposition of the trends. 12 
 13 
Figure 3. Consequences of current emissions and projected near-term trends. Comparison of 14 
annual carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production (a) together with time 15 
slices for 2014 (b) and 2019 (c). The scenarios are from the IPCC AR5 WGIII emission database 16 
(red, blue), and updated estimates and projections from this study (black and red dots). Horizontal 17 
lines show median estimates. Panel (c) additionally includes 2019 emission levels estimated to 18 
result from a full implementation of Cancún pledges (yellow). The values in panel (c) indicate the 19 
number of scenarios available in the WGIII scenario database for each category.  20 
 21 
Figure 4. Comparison of trends in the IPCC AR5 WGIII scenario database and projected 22 
near-term trends. Histogram of growth rates 2010-2019 in global CO2 emissions (a), world GDP 23 
(b), and carbon intensity of GDP (c). Colours differentiate the baseline scenarios (red) and 24 
 17 
mitigation scenarios without delay (blue) and with delay (brown), and our GDP-based projections 1 
(red vertical lines) with their uncertainty (grey).  2 
 18 
 1 
Table 1. Cumulative carbon budget (GtCO2), remaining emission quota from 2015 and 2020 2 
(GtCO2) and equivalent emission years associated with a 66% or 50% probability of global-mean 3 
warming below 2°C, 3°C, and 4°C (relative to 1850-1900).  The equivalent emission-years 4 
correspond to the emission quota divided by the last available year of emissions, given for 2°C and 5 
3°C only. Cumulative emissions and quotas are shown with a 5%–95% range, rounded to the 6 
nearest 100. 7 
 8 
 9 
 2°C 3°C 4°C 
66% 50% 66% 50% 66% 50% 
Cumulative budget 
(since 1870) 
3200 
[2900-3600] 
3500 
[3100-3900] 
4900 
[4500-5700] 
5300 
[5000-6200] 
6400 
[6100-7700] 
7100 
[7000-8500] 
 
From 
2015 
Remaining 
quota 
1200 
[900-1600] 
1500 
[1100-1900] 
2900 
[2500-3700] 
3300 
[3000-4200] 
4400 
[4100-5700] 
5100 
[5000-6500] 
Emission-
years 
30 
[22-40] 
37 
[27-47] 
72 
[62-92] 
82 
[74-104] 
- - 
 
From 
2020 
Remaining 
quota 
1000 
[700-1400] 
1300 
[800-1700] 
2700 
[2300-3500] 
3100 
[2800-4000] 
4200 
[3900-5500] 
4900 
[4700-6300] 
Emission-
years 
22 
[15-30] 
28 
[19-38] 
58 
[49-75] 
67 
[60-86] 
- - 
 10 
 11 
 12 
 19 
 1 
Table 2. Estimated CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production for years 2013, 2014, and 2019, together with growth 2 
rates. 3 
 4 
 
2013 2014 2019 
  
Total 
(GtCO2/yr) 
Per 
capita 
(tCO2/p) 
Cumulative 
1870-2013 
(GtCO2) 
Growth 
2012-
13 (%) 
Total 
(GtCO2/yr) 
Growth 
2013-14 
(%) 
Total 
(GtCO2/yr) 
Cumulative 
1870-2019 
(GtCO2) 
Growth 
2014-
19 (%) 
World 
36.1 5.0 1430 2.3 37.0 2.5 43.2 1670 3.1 
[34.3-37.9]   
[1360-
1500] 
  [34.8-39.3] [1.3-3.5] [39.7-45.6] 
[1590-
1750]  
China 10.0 7.2 161 4.2 10.4 4.5 12.7 230 3.9 
US 5.2 16.4 370 2.9 5.2 -0.9 5.2 401 0.2 
EU28 3.5 6.8 328 -1.8 3.4 -1.1 3.3 348 -0.9 
India 2.4 1.9 44 5.1 2.5 4.9 3.4 62 5.9 
We make leap year adjustments to these growth rates and this causes growth rates to go up approximately 0.3% if the 
first year is a leap year and down 0.3% if the second year is a leap year. 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 20 
 1 
 2 
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